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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
GUS CHOURNOS and
VEVE CHOURNOS,
Plaintiffs
and Appellants,

v.

CASE NO. 17363

NICK D'AGNILLO, et ux.,
Defendants
and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to establish a right-of-way by
prescription in favor of plaintiff and against adjacent
landowner defendants.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court.

From a Judgment

for the defendants, denying plaintiffs' claim of rightof-way by prescription, quieting title of defendants as
against all claims of plaintiffs, and denying plaintiffs'
motion for a new trial, plaintiffs have appealed.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek affirmation of the Judgment of the
District Court in their favor.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants' Statement of Facts fails to state the
facts presented to and relied upon by the trial court
in its finding of judgment in favor of respondents. The
facts as determined and relied upon by the trial court
are as follows:

Appellants and respondents are adjacent

property owners of property located in Riverdale, Weber
County, Utah, fronting on the northerly right-of-way line
of Riverdale Road.

(Exhibits 4P, SP, 6P)

Both properties

were essentially used for farming until 1946, at which
time Riverdale Road and the viaduct over the railroad
tracks and the Weber River were completed.

(T 72)

There-

after, the use of the properties in the area gradually
changed into commercial use.
Respondents acquired their property from the parents
of Nick D'Agnillo, who had purchased the property from
Hendrieka Becker in December of 1939.

The Warranty Deed

of conveyance described the whole 7.4 acres of land,
excepting a right-of-way over the easterly fourteen feet,
as reserved in a Deed dated August 23, 1911.

(Exhibit 6PI

Respondents have continually used the property, including
the east fourteen feet subject to the right-of-way, from
1939 to the present for agricultural purposes.
78, 79, 81, 82, 86, 99, 144, 162)

(T75, 75,

Respondents utilized,
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with other deeded owners, the east fourteen foot right-ofway portion of their deeded property as an access to their
other farm land lying to the south of Riverdale Road, which
road was constructed about seven years after respondent,
Nick D'Agnillo's father and mother had acquired the property.
(T71)

At least three other property owners and the power

company held deeded rights to utilize the easterly fourteen
foot right-of-way over respondents' property to gain access
to their farm properties lying to the south of Riverdale
Road and to service

power linen.

102, 103, 104, 118, 129, 139)

(Tl7, 18, 37, 40, 71, 72,

A fence constructed of

wooden posts and barbed wire separated appellants' and
respondents' properties along appellants' west property
line.

(T73, 130)

Sometime near 1946, the southerly

portion of this fence fell down from disrepair, so that no
fence existed on the i:Joundary line between the properties of the
parties, until a new fence was constructed by respondents
in April of 1977.

(TS, 11, 95, 107, 108, 130, 131)

However, an irrigation ditch approximately three feet in
width separated the two properties along the southerly
portion of the boundary line of the old fallen fence;
some time

near

1946, the southerly portion of this open

irrigation ditch was piped by using old hot water tanks
with the tops and bottoms removed, placed end to end, and
covered over with a few inches of dirt.
74)

(Tl2, 24, 25, 73,

Light vehicles could cross this covered ditch area
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along the boundary line, but it would not support heavier
vehicles.

(T24)

Approximately fourteen feet to the west

of the boundary line of the parties, respondents maintained
a barbed wire fence to enclose their farm equipment and
calves in the pasture to the west of the fence.
BO, 104)

In

(T41, 77,

1961, three telephone or electric light

utility poles, thirty to forty feet in length, were placed
along the southerly ninety feet, moreorless, of the boundar;'
line of the properties, lying end to end a few feet to the
west of the covered portion of the irrigation ditch.
78, 103, 104, 133, 145, 146, 162, 163)

(T77,

These utility poles

remained for three or more years, and they constituted a
ground barrier which prevented motor vehicle travel from
appellants' property across the east fourteen feet of
respondents' property to gain access to Riverdale Road.
(T78, 106, 134, 163)
In March of 1977, appellants commenced construction
of a drive-in window on the west side of their
building.

(Tl07)

The trial judge inspected the

properties of the parties at the commencement of the trial,
and in the facts stated in his Memorandum Decision
found that an out-cropping window was constructed on the
west side of respondents' building which was the proper
height to be used as a service window for sales to per~M
inside automobiles; the court termed it as a "take-out
window".

(M·.~morandum

· ·
Decision
,page 6 ; ( T2 ,

3, 4 • 5 • 6l
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In March of 1977, respondents' son, John D'Agnillo, had
a conversation with appellant, Gus Chournos, in which
Chournos informed John D'Agnillo that he was constructing a drive-in window, and that he intended to
utilize the easterly portion of respondents' property
for the access lane to Riverdale Road.

John D'Agnillo

informed Chournos that he could not make such use of
his father's property.

(T 107, 108)

In April of 1977,

respondents constructed a steel post barbed wire fence
along the old boundary line between the parties, where
the original fence had fallen down years before.

(T' 108)

In September of 1978, appellants filed the within action
claiming a right-of-way by prescription over the east
fourteen feetof respondents' property adjacent and to
the west of appellants' building and drive-in window, for
use as

an ingess and egress lane of travel onto River-

dale Road.
Prior to 1946, appellants' property was owned by the
Childs family, who made no claim either by deed or use
of any portion of respondents' property which is the
subject of this dispute.

(Tl3, 14)

In 1946, the Childs

conveyed the premises to Jesse M. Stephens, and it was
Stephens who enclosed the southerly portion of the old
irrigation ditch utilizing the old hot water tanks.
(Tl2, 24, 25)

At this time the old boundary line fence
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between the properties had fallen down.

(T8, 11, 95)

Stephens constructed the first building upon appellants
premises around 1946, which building he utilized as a
blacksmith shop.

The original building was located

approximately twenty nine feet east of his west property
line, and there were some doors on the west side thereof
for vehicles to enter and egress.

(T .9)

Any use by

Stephens or his customers of any portion of respondents'
property was rare.

(TlO, 75)

In 1951, Stephens sold

the property to Myrtle Cornish, formerly Myrtle Warner.
(T24)
Mrs. Cornish and her former husband, Mr. Warner,
remodeled the building and then leased it to a series
of successive tenants from 1951 through 1969, in which
year they sold the property to appellants.

(T 27)

The

first such tenant was an auction-liquidation house,
occupying the premises for about one year.

(T27, 31)

In 1952, the second tenant, a Jim Knight, leased the
premises for about three years and used it as a beer
tavern or private liquor club; his customers did not
drive vehicles across respondents' property in the
area in which appellant claimed a prescriptive easement.

(T 27,

31, 35)

Thereafter, a Ray Nelson leased

the premises and operated it as a beer tavern, but his
customers did not drive across respondents' property
now the subject of this dispute.

(T 32)

From 1961
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through 1964, a Ray Hansen and his son, Bill Hansen,
leased the property as a beer tavern, but their customers did not drive across the disputed area.
36)

(T 35,

Appellants first entered into possession of the

property in 1964, under a five year lease from Mrs.
Cornish, which extended until 1969,when appellants
purchased the property from Mrs. Cornish.
46)

(T 27, 45,

Appellants operated the property as a beer tavern,

and after adding a kitchen to the building in 1970,
they thereafter operated the premises as a restaurant
and a beer tavern.

(T 50)

Appellant, Gus Chournos,

testified that his customers and delivery people drove
across and parked motor vehicles in the area in dispute
from 1964 through 1969.

(T 49, 52, 53, 55, 56)

Re-

spondents' witnesses, Nick D'Agnillo, John D'Agnillo,
Willis J. Mitchell, Joseph D'Agnillo, and William K.
Taylor testified to the effect that the customers of
appellants and the prior lessees extending from April,
1977, back twenty years to 1957, did not drive motor
vehicles across,nor did they park motor vehicles in
the area in dispute, as claimed by appellants. (TR 78,
105, 116, 130, 131, 132, 135, 136, 137, 143, 154, 157,
163, 165, 171, 175, 176)
Appellants' and respondents' evidence was presented
to the court on May 21, 1980, and after respondents'

7
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counsel rested their case, attorney for appellants
to the court, "That's all I have.
your Honor.
question.

stat~

I have no rebuttal,

May I just ask Mr. Chournos here just one
That's all, I promise."

(T

182)

Thereafter,

counsel asked Mr. Chournos one other question, and then
he stated, "I have nothing further . . . . " (T

182)

The case was thereafter set for argument six days later
on May 27, 1980.

Prior to entering the courtroom for

the presentation of arguments, the trial Judge, in
chambers, asked the respective counsel if either had
further evidence to present, and each counsel replied
that he did not. counsel thereupon entered the courtroom
and presented their closing arguments,

and the

court stated to counsel that he would read their respective trial briefs and give his decision to his secretary.

(T 184)

At no time during the trial did

appellants' counsel inform the court or respondents
that Mr. Ray Hansen was going to appear as a witness,
but that he became ill.

At no time between May 21,

1980, when the evidence was presented, and May 27, 1980,
when the closing arguments were presente d , dJ_. d appellants'
counsel claim that he had any further evidence to present
by any witness, nor did he inform the trial court or
respondents' counse 1 tha t Mr. Hansen Or any Ot her witness
· 1·
was ill on May 21, 1980, at the time o f tria

on June 11.
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1980, twelve days after the entry of the trial court's
Memorandum Decision in favor of appellants,is the first
time that counsel for appellants notified the trial court
and respondents' counsel that he desired to present to
the court the testimony of Mr. Ray Hansen, who he stated
was ill on May 21, 1980.

This information was presented

in appellants' Motion for a New Trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANTS FAILED TO PROVE BY CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE A PRESCRIPTIVE
RIGHT-OF-WAY ACROSS RESPONDENTS' PROPERTY
Utah case law clearly recognizes the doctrine of
"right-of-way by prescription", and the Utah Supreme
Court has declared that such a right-of-way may be
established by open, notorious, continuous, adverse use
against the owner of the subservient property for a term
of twenty years.

Zolinger v. Frank, 75 P2 714,(1946 ).

In the Zolinger case, Justice Wolfe defines the meaning
of "adverse use" and states that the adverse use means
a use that must be against the subservient owner as
distinguished from under the owner.
In the case of Jensen v. Gerrard, et al., 39 P2 1070,
(1935), at page 1072 of the opinion, Justice Hanson
stated:

9
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"The burden was upon them to establish such
claim by clear and satisfactory evidence."
Thereafter, in Buckley v. Cox, et al, 247 P 2 277
(1952), the court cited Jensen v. Gerrard, supra, and
further clarified the burden of proof of a claimant of
a prescriptive easement wherein Justice McDonough declared at pages 279 and 280 of the opinion:
"Furthermore, since the defendants claimed the
right to use the driveway by prescription, they
have the burden of establishing such claim by
clear and convincing evidence."
Continuing on at page 80, the court said:
"It was defendant's burden to overcome this
presumption and to establish his claim by
clear and convincing evidence.
Jensen v. Gerrard,
supra.
This, in the judgment of the lower court,
he failed to do."
Morris v. Blunt, et al., 161 P. 1127,

(1916) is a

frequently cited Utah case on the law of prescriptive
easements.

This case is authority for the well recog-

nized rule that the adverse use must be continuous,
without interruption, for the prescriptive period of
twenty one years.

The rule

is stated in the following

language at page 1131 of the opinion:
"Under the well-established rule, the use, in
order that it may ripen into a prescriptive
title, must, in any case, not only be adverse
and continuous, and under claim of right for
a period of twenty years, but it must be
uninterrupted throughout that period."
The necessity of an uninterrupted adverse use for
a full twenty year period was again emphasized by the
Utah Supreme Court in the more recent case of Thompson
v. Griffiths,

344 P

2

983,

(1959) wherein Justice Wade,
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at page 985, stated:
"Suffice it to say that there was sufficient
evidence from which the trier of the facts
could reasonably find that at no time was
there a full twenty-year period when the use
by the owner of the dominent estate was
adverse and uninterrupted."
Another rule of law in regard to the establishment
of prescriptive easements, that has relevant application
in this action, is the rule enunciated in Nielson v.
Sandberg, 141 P2 696 (1943) to the effect that the claimant
of the prescriptive easement must show that he has acquired
it by his own use.
would allow

Respondents acknowledge that such a use

a claimant tacking onto any periods of use through his

predecessors in title during any uninterrupted twenty-year
period.

At page 700 of the opinion, the rules was stated

as follows:
"A party claiming the right must show that he
has acquired it by his own use, independent of
others; he cannot make his right depend in any
degree upon the enjoyment of a similar right
by others.
(citations)"
The above principal of law was more recently cited
by Judge Maughan in Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc.,
559 P

2

948

(1977) at page 950 of the opinion.

Respondents have no quarrel with the case law cited
in appellants'brief if applied in accordance with the facts
as found by the trial court in this case.

It is the duty

and prerogative of this court to review both law and fact
and to consider the weight and sufficiency of the evidence.
Respondents are entitled to the benefit of the well established
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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rule that the facts as found by the trial court, as a trier
of the facts, will be reviewed in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party, and that the Findings of Fact will
not be disturbed unless they are shown to be manifestly
erroneous, as to demonstrate oversight, or mistake materially affecting the rights of appellants.
Struhs, 412 P2 314

(1966).

Richins v.

The facts as set forth in

respondents' Statement of Facts are supported by the
evidence in the transcript and should be viewed from the
point of advantage of the trial court because of its
proxirni ty to the parties, the witnesses, its examination of
the site, and its observation of the trial.

An application of the recited rules of law to the
facts established during the trial, supported by the cited
record, and as stated in the court's Memorandum Decision
and Findings of Fact, clearly demonstrates that a right-of·
way by prescription against Respondents' property has not
been established by appellants.

In April, 1977, respondent

re-established a barrier along the old fence line between
the properties by their construction of the steel post and
barbed wire fence which thereafter blocked access to any
portion of respondents' property by vehicular traffic fi~
appellants' property.

Looking backwards twenty consecuti'·'

years from April 1977, through April 1958, there was a two
year period of interruption of use in 196], and 1962. Thi:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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interruption of use was caused by the telephone utility
poles placed on the ground, end-to-end, along the old
fence line, which blocked any possibility of vehicular
use across respondents' property by appellants' predecessor Hansen, who leased and operated the property
from 1961 until 1964.

Regardless of any other acts of

adverse use which appellants claim to have established,
such use was not continuous,but was interrupted for a
two year period in 1961 and 1962.

The evidence clearly

establishes that the boundary line fence between the
properties fell into disrepair in 1946, and there was
no evidence of any adverse use by appellants and their
predecessors prior to that year.

Looking forward from

1946 through a twenty year term, ending in 1966, the
required twenty year restrictive use term was interrupted
for a period of two years, in 1961 and 1962.

The trial

court, in fact, found that the evidence did not establish
that there had ever been any open and notorious use by
appellants and their predecessors in interest under any
claim of right over and across respondents' property;
there

had been occasional intrusions of vehicles into

the area that would constitute trespass.

The trial court

found and the evidence supports the fact that there was
no open notorious claim of right to the use of respondents'
adjacent property as a vehicle parking lot.
The two year period of interruption of any claimed
use, in 1961 and 1962, would shorten the last claimed use
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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period ending in 1977, to fifteen years.

There is no

evidence of any claim of use by appellants' predecessors
in title prior to 1946.

Prior to 1946, the old wood

and barbed wire fence constituted a barrier between the
two properties, and the construction of Riverdale Road
to which the ingress and egress right-of-way is claimed,
was not completed until 1946.

(T 72, 155)

Appellants

cannot base their claim of use upon the use of land
owners who possessed deeded right-of-ways across the east
fourteen feet of respondents' property.

The case of

Nielson v. Sandberg, supra, enunciates the rule

that

t~

claiming party must show that it has acquired its claim
by its own use, independent of others.
Appellants have made no reference in their brief of
any evidence that would in any way indicate the trial cour'.
was guilty of an abuse of its discretion in determining the
facts, nor in making application of the law.

This court rna:'

review the facts in the light of the evidence as believed
by the trial court, and not necessarily as urged upon the
court from the point of view of the appellants.
Condrack, 478 P

2

327 (1970).

Kier v.

One of the long established

rules in regard to the basis upon which an appellate court
views the findings of fact of a trial court is:

That be·

cause of the advantageous position of the trial court with
its first-hand observation of the testimony and derneanM~
the witnesses, the appellate court will view the trial
court's findings with considerable indulgence, and su~
·
findings will
not b e upset unless the evi'dence prepon~r~~
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tr

against them, or the trial court has mistaken or misapplied the law applicable to them.
539 P 2 452, 454.

Pagano v Walker,

(1975)

An examination of the relevant testimony of all of

the witnesses as set forth in the transcript and the
other evidence before the court, including its physical
observation of the premises during the trial, clearly
establishes that appellants failed to carry their burden
of proof by the clear and convincing evidence required.
The facts presented at the trial simply did not support
the requirements of law for the establishment of a prescriptive right-of-way across respondents' property
through twenty years of open, notorious, continuous,
adverse use.
POINT II
APPELLANTS'MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL,
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO REOPEN
THE TRIAL TO RECEIVE ADDITIONAL
TESTIMONY WAS PROPERLY DENIED BY
THE TRIAL COURT
Under Rule 59(a) (3)of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
in an action tried without jury, the trial court may grant
a new trial, open the judgment, take additional testimony,
or amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, or
make new Findings and Conclusions of Law by reason of
accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
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•
In the case of Jensen v. Thomas, 570 P

695,

2

(1977),

which was a personal injury action wherein the plaintiff
claimed surprise by the testimony of a physician, but
plaintiff made no timely objection on the basis of surprise
the court in commenting upon the application of Rule 59 (ai'
stated at Page 696 as follows:
"A ruling on a motion for a new trial will not be
disturbed on appeal except when there is a clear
abuse of the Court's discretion.
We do not believe
the Court abused its discretion in denying that
motion on the basis of Rule 59 (a) (3), as that Rule
speaks about surprise 'which ordinary prudence could
not have guarded against.'
On the contrary, the
surprise could, we believe, have been guarded
against."
Thereafter, in Anderson v. Bradley, 590 P

2

339,

(1979),

at Page 341 of the Opinion this Court again emphasized that
surprise as a ground for a new trial is only that which
ordinary prudence could have guarded against.
It is submitted that in this action there was nosurpr~
Appellants made no objection or claim of surprise at the
time of trial or six days later at the time of argument. ro:
witnesses testified on behalf of respondents of the exislffi'
of the utility poles lying on the ground asn an obstructior.
5

along the boundary line in 1961, and 1962, when a RayHan '
leased the premises now owned by appellants.
104, 133, 145, 146, 162, 163)

(T 77, 78,!0l,

Appellants made no claim of

surprise or objection to any of the cited testimony.

ndentl
Prior to the trial appellants' counsel informed res!Xl

16
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counsel that, "I might use Mr. Hansen."
a witness.

(T 183)

at the trial as

At no time during the proceeding was

Mr. Hansen called as a witness, nor was he subpoenaed as such.
At the time respondents rested their case on May 21, 1980,
appellants' stated:
"That's all I have.
Honor."
(T 182)

I have no rebuttal, your

No mention of Mr. Hansen as a witness, and no claim of
surprise by any testimony presented at the trial, was made
between the day of trial on May 21, 1980, and the day of
final argument on May 27, 1980.

In chambers, prior to the

presentation of the final arguments, the trial judge asked
if either counsel had further evidence to present to the
Court prior to arguemnts; both counsel

stated that they

did not have further evidence, and they thereafter entered
the courtroom and presented their closing arguments.
It was not until after the court had issued its
Memorandum Decision on May 30, 1980 and its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, on June 10, 1980,
that appellants thereafter filed their Motion for a new
trial on June 11, 1980.

It was in apPellants'motion for a

new trial that the first mention of Mr. Hansen as a witness
or of Mr. Hansen being ill was reported to the Court or to
respondents' counsel.

It was in the motion for a new trial

that appellants' counsel first made any mention of surprise.
It is submitted that there was in fact no surprise, and if
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there had been any surprise, it could have easily been
guarded against by a timely objection to the court and by
furnishing information to the Court and respondents• counse:
about the claimed illness of Mr. Ray Hansen.

Appellants

did not take the oral depositions of any of respondents'
witnesses prior to the trial.
In the interest of economy and justice, each trial must
come to a timely conclusion.

Counsel have the duty and

responsibility to determine on behalf of their clients,
during the trial procedings, when they shall elect to conck
the presentation of evidence and rest their case.

Attorney'

are not granted the privilege and luxury of waiting until
after the case has been argued, taken under advisement, and
ruled upon by the Court, to then elect to present the origimi
testimony of just one more witness.

The time for such a

decision has long since passed.
Ordinary prudence could have guarded against any such
claimed surprise, by the proper utilization of the rules

o:

discovery, by timely objection to the claimed surprise
evidence, or by a request for continuance because of the
illness of a necessary witness.
taken by appellants.

None of these actions were

It was within the discretion of the

trial court and in the interest of justice that appellants
motion for a new trial or in the alternative to reopen the
trial proceeding, was denied.
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POINT III
RESPONDENTS DO HAVE RECORDED TITLE
TO THE RIGHT OF WAY CLAIMED BY APPELLANTS
Appellants' claim of right of way against respondents
property is based solely upon a prescriptive use.

Appellants

make no claim of title by deed or any other source to any
part of respondents' property.

The status of the quality

of respondents' title to the property conveyed to them
through the recorded instruments in their chain of title
is wholly immaterial to appellants' claims as tried by the
court.
In the deeds of conveyance to respondents through their
predecessors, the various deeds, after describing the whole
7.4acres of property to be conveyed contained the following
clause:

"Excepting, a right of way 14 feet wide, the center

line o-f which is described as follows:
description of center line set forth)

(metes and bounds
. . . as the same is

described and excepted in deed recorded August 23, 1911 in
Book 67 of deeds at Page 78".

Words of exception and reserva-

tion have been used so indiscriminately in reference to
easements and rights of way that they may be treated as
synonymous in meaning, and the legal intent is to be detennined
not by the word used but by the purport indicated in the
entire grant.

In discussing the use of words of exception

and reservation, it is stated in Thompson on Real Property,
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Sec. 3090, VOL. 6 Page 777, as follows:
"In order to determine whether a reservation or
an exception has been made, the court must look
to the substance of the right exepted or reserved
and make an independent determination, regardless '
of whether the right is termed an exception or a
reservation in the instrument . . . .
It is often difficult to distinguish between
an exception and a reservation in a deed, and the
words, 'reserving' and 'excepting' are not conclusive
in determining which is intended.
The character
and effect of the provision in which such words
occur must determine what is intended."
The Conclusions stated in the trial court's Memorandum
Decision dated May 3, 1980 properly ruled that the deed oi
conveyance to respondents transferred a fee simple title
subject to a right of way.

The court relied upon the princifa:

that the law abhors small strips of land which are never
conveyed, and attaches them to properties which are conveyec
The testimony presented at trial discloses that at all time:
subsequent to the deed of conveyance to the D' Agnillo farnil
in December, 1939 ,that they have continually used all of the
premises for agricultural purposes, subject only to the
use of the fourteen foot right of way along the easterly
portion thereof by those persons who held deeded interests
therein.
Respondents again emphasize the fact that the quality
·
or status of marketabi 1 ity
o f respondents' ti' tle is wholll'
in this act~n,
immaterial to the claims made by appellants
which is a claim based solely upon prescriptive use.
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CONCLUSION
The appellants failed to present to the trial court
clear and convincing evidence of a right of way by prescriptive use against the respondents.

The trial court properly

exercised its broad discretion in refusing to grant appellants
a new trial or to reopen the case for the purpose of receiving
additional testimony.

The judgment of the trial court should

be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
KUNZ, KUNZ & HADLEY

BY:~~~~~~+-'-1....4."""""TL T. KUNZ
Attorney for
and Respondents
Suite 300, 2605 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 394-4573
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